



Espionage activities in the perspective of international law

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ABSTRACT

This study's overarching goals are to determine whether or whether espionage operations constitute a breach of state sovereignty, the nature and extent of such a breach, the impact on international law, and the methods used to address such disputes. Normative law, which entails investigating relevant legal concepts and statutes, is the research methodology used. The legislative method is the cornerstone of this strategy, which is based on library research that encompasses primary, secondary, and tertiary legal literature. National sovereignty and international law are both violated by espionage operations, according to the study's findings. Possible remedies to espionage in the context of diplomatic relations include designating the offender as a "persona non grata," severing diplomatic ties, or taking legal action at the International Court of Justice. By taking these measures, we are showing that we value peaceful resolution of disputes by diplomatic and legal means, and that we are committed to upholding international law and the global system.

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1. Introduction

No sovereign nation may impose its will on another sovereign nation; this is a fundamental principle of international law. In this narrower context, aside from independence, sovereignty also denotes equality (Starke, 2006).

Accurate information on strategic elements is necessary for the practise of diplomatic relations between independent countries, which in turn requires a country to gather and handle information. Though there are a variety of approaches to data collection, none of them may violate international law if used in a country. The Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 states in Article 3, paragraph (1) letter d, "Ascertaining, by all legal means, conditions and developments in the receiving state and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state" that the envoy from the sending country can report on the receiving state's conditions and developments to the sending state using any legal mean available to them (Syahmin, 2008).

State intelligence institutions normally gather strategic information; these institutions are both security actors and tools for the state, with the goal of detecting, identifying, assessing, analysing, interpreting, and presenting intelligence in order to give early warning of different

kinds and types of possible dangers, in an attempt to bolster policymakers' capacity to accomplish national objectives and ensure national security. Political, social, economic, and legal factors all have a role in shaping state intelligence (Fitri Atur Arum, 2016).

Cyber espionage and conventional espionage both involve the unlawful acquisition of information with the potential to undermine the security and sovereignty of the target country, which can lead to the severe or complete severing of diplomatic relations between the two nations (Shoelhi, 2011). Because Indonesia's data security measures are inadequate and the country's laws pertaining to data protection are not yet in place, cyber espionage might take place there (Amer et al., 2022).

According to Resolution No. 2625 of 1970 of the United Nations General Assembly, which is in accordance with the United Nations Charter, every state is obligated to fulfil its obligations in good faith under the generally recognised principles and rules of international law. This declaration is about friendly relations and cooperation among states. In accordance with the norms and principles of international law, every state is obligated to act in good faith while engaging in cooperative ties with other states.

Nevertheless, this data collecting must be done in a legitimate way that complies with international law. Data gathering by the transmitting nation must adhere to all applicable laws and regulations, as stated in the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961. However, diplomatic disputes between nations are not uncommon and may be sparked by espionage operations, including cyber espionage. Countries like Indonesia, where data security laws are still in their infancy and government oversight is lacking, are especially vulnerable to this kind of attack.

Every nation is obligated to act in good faith in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, as stated in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution pertaining to the Declaration on the Principles of International Law governing Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. As a result, it's critical to remember that other nations' sovereignty must be respected while collecting data. These matters emphasise how critical it is to comprehend the boundaries of international law and the repercussions of crossing them, particularly when it comes to espionage and information collection, which may often lead to strained diplomatic relations and the erosion of state sovereignty.

The following questions arise from the above summary of the research: (1) Is it possible to classify espionage operations as breaches of state sovereignty, and if so, what are the repercussions? And (2) how is the conflict settled when espionage actions go against the rules of international law?

When states engage in espionage, they often do it in a way that is inconsistent with or even contrary to international law. This evaluation might reveal areas that want more development or clarification, as well as any contradictions or ambiguities in the legal framework.

The idea of state accountability in espionage instances may be investigated via this study. It has the potential to investigate the legal procedures in place to deal with instances of state-sponsored espionage as well as the methods by which governments are judged for the actions of their intelligence organizations.

2. Method

This study falls under the category of normative legal research as it analyses relevant legal concepts and statutes (Soekanto, 2007). By reviewing relevant statutes and case law, the study presented here falls within the category of normative legal research. This study's legal materials are sourced via library research and include primary, secondary, and tertiary sources (Mahmud Marzuki, 2005). A statutory method was used in this investigation.

Applying suitable research methodologies is crucial to understanding the issue statement of espionage-related breaches of state sovereignty and its consequences for international law. The

chosen approach should be versatile enough to delve into the complexities of espionage and its effects on international relations from a legal, political, and diplomatic perspective.

When considering whether or whether espionage operations are illegal under international law, a normative juridical perspective is very pertinent. As part of this strategy, a number of legal instruments, including treaties, international conventions, and United Nations resolutions, are examined. Additionally, this method necessitates investigation into espionage-related jurisprudence or rulings from international courts. This allows scholars to better understand the principles and standards of law that apply to espionage cases and how these laws are enforced and understood.

The second point is that studying the methods of espionage and the effects they have on international relations is best accomplished via a qualitative approach based on case studies. Research into past espionage cases, whether they have been solved or not, may provide light on the motivations, strategies, and outcomes of such operations. The diplomatic and political variables at play in espionage operations may be better understood with this information. By bringing these perspectives together, we can examine espionage from every angle, from its effects on state sovereignty and international relations to its place in international law.

3. Analysis and Results

3.1. Analysis of Espionage Activities as a Threat to State Sovereignty

It is impossible to divorce the persona of Colonel Zulkifli Lubis from the origins of Indonesian intelligence. This person was instrumental in establishing Indonesia's clandestine intelligence service. The day after Christmas in 1923, Zulkifli Lubis came into this world in Aceh (Ken, 2007). As a cadet, he became a part of the map. Lubis initially got familiar with the fundamentals of intelligence in this map. It was at this time that Japan established an intelligence gathering agency, maybe modelled after the illustrious Nakano military intelligence school in Japan. Lubis graduated early on as well. The Japanese regional intelligence centre was the next stop for Lubis. It may be said that Lubis has more experience in military intelligence than any other Indonesian when Japan capitulated in August 1945.

One may argue that the Indonesian army's battle chances were small due to the inadequate quality of their combat equipment during that period. In response to the critical nature of the situation, Lubis spearheaded the formation of the Special Agency (BI), the first intelligence organisation in Indonesia. About forty ex-PETA officers and ex-Japanese informants in Jakarta were the first members. Lubis taught them intelligence methods, psychological warfare, and sabotage in a week or less. They were sent out throughout Java with instructions to seek Republic help and report back on any hostile activity, all on this restricted basis (Ken, 2007).

The intelligence operations of the young Indonesian state were disorganised and headed by neophytes, which hindered the capacity of the national leadership to make optimal political decisions. President Sukarno relied on military officers for direction on most political policy issues, even though he signed all BI approval papers. He often lacked personal supervision over the results of the operations.

A new agency was established to address these weaknesses and provide a more formal intelligence operation suitable for a state that was preserving its sovereignty. On May 7, 1946, the State Secret Service (Brani) was established with the purpose of providing a unified framework for intelligence units in Java that report to field commanders. Brani, who was still reporting to Colonel Lubis, attempted to streamline operations in preparation for the prospect of a re-strengthening of the Dutch army. Amir Sjarifuddin, the minister of defence, was at the centre of a political power struggle that unfolded inside the defence and security organisational system. There is a separate intelligence agency under the Ministry of Defence with extensive powers, and the military in particular continues to play a significant role in shaping

government policy. As soon as the threat of civilian interference from national spy agencies became apparent, the Defence Agency B was established (Wirawan, 2005).

Military factions still sought to demonstrate their supremacy inside the national intelligence agency, and Brani faced formidable opposition despite President Sukarno's direct backing. This is connected to the desires of a small number of high-ranking Brani officials who are pushing for civilian control over intelligence agencies. On the other hand, the political spectrum at the time revealed the continued dominance of the center-left group, which had ideological disagreements with the military (i.e., FNI). At that point, political officials ordered the disbandment of Brani, and the Defence Department established Section V to oversee national intelligence (Wirawan, 2005).

Given that many changes in institutional structure happened only as a consequence of changes in facultative policies and had significant political subtleties, Indonesian intelligence had not yet revealed the predicted shape under such circumstances. Major organisational changes took place within the State secret agency, particularly as it pertained to military formations, during Colonel TB Simatupang's tenure as head of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, who believes that the military should be involved in national political decision-making, established the new structure known as the Armed Forces Staff Information Bureau (BISAP) (Wirawan, 2005).

Evidence of intelligence agencies and espionage infiltration may be found in this historical context. The intelligence and political dynamics of Indonesia in the early days of independence, particularly during President Sukarno's tenure, may be traced back to the analysis of espionage operations as a danger to state sovereignty. When it came to running the country's intelligence organisations, civilian and military factions were at odds with one another. With President Sukarno's backing, the State Forces Research Agency (Brani) was up against other military factions that sought to consolidate power. At the time, the military and the center-left group were powerful political forces; yet, this challenge represented the ambition of certain high brass under Brani to control the intelligence system.

The Ministry of Defense's decision to establish Section V and dissolve Brani revealed that Indonesian intelligence's institutional structure was unstable and subject to swings. The form and emphasis of state intelligence may be influenced by changes in political policy, which can be rather nuanced (Amer et al., 2022). The creation of the Armed Forces Staff Information Bureau (BISAP) under the leadership of Colonel TB Simatupang brought about significant institutional changes in the Armed Forces. This bureau highlighted the necessity for links between national political choices and military strategy.

Following this timeline, it is easy to see how counter-espionage initiatives and intelligence organisations have grown into major players in Indonesian politics ever since the country gained independence. It is clear that the military values intelligence information for its role in informing political and national security choices because of its engagement in intelligence gathering.

Though the setting and tactics have evolved substantially due to technology advancements, the problem of espionage is still pertinent in today's world. The primary emphasis of contemporary intelligence defence is cyber security and cyber espionage. Similar to other nations, Indonesia is not immune to the dangers of digital espionage, which endanger not only the country's safety but also the confidentiality and authenticity of individual and public records (Puluhulawa et al., 2023)

Here, national intelligence is responsible for more than just collecting data; it must also defend the country against cyberattacks (Suwito et al., 2023). Intelligence policies and tactics need to be adjusted to tackle emerging types of espionage. To better understand how a nation adjusts its intelligence strategy to safeguard national security and sovereignty in the face of changing

challenges, it is instructive to examine the development and evolution of Indonesia's intelligence services.

3.2. Procedures and International Dispute Resolution related to Espionage Activities

A web of processes and conflict resolution mechanisms are set in motion when espionage operations are involved, which has long been a contentious subject in the field of international relations and international law (Harahap et al., 2023). Beginning with the gathering of substantial and tangible evidence at the espionage's identification and accusation stage, this procedure gets underway. Nations asserting espionage allegations are compelled to gather and submit compelling proof, which may include tangible papers, digital information, or witness accounts, to substantiate their assertions.

Diplomatic routes are often used for relaying allegations of espionage. Typically, when a nation feels wronged, it may send diplomatic letters or call on the embassy of the country in question to express its concerns and charges. Some nations that believe they have been spied on may choose to make the accusations public, particularly if they believe this will put more pressure on the nation that is being held accountable (Amato et al., 2023).

However, in response to espionage allegations, international organisations like the UN and its Security Council often provide platforms for discussion and response. The United Nations cannot directly intervene in espionage cases, but it may serve as a forum where member states can voice their concerns and rally international support. When dealing with espionage accusations, regional organisations like NATO, the European Union, or ASEAN may get engaged, particularly if many member nations are implicated (Pudner et al., 2007).

When it comes to settling espionage conflicts, elements of international law are crucial as well. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is one such international treaty that prohibits the use of diplomatic posts for espionage and has other rules that are pertinent to espionage operations. However, as international law does not include clear and unambiguous regulations pertaining to espionage, it might be difficult to apply international law in espionage instances (Luo et al., 2022).

In addition to requiring delicate management and often involving intricate talks, sometimes behind the scenes, espionage cases have a tendency to generate substantial political and diplomatic problems. Legal, diplomatic, and, in rare cases, political and military factors are all part of this process of conflict settlement. When it comes to espionage cases, a multidisciplinary approach is crucial for finding fair and effective solutions that balance varied interests.

Conflict and dispute resolution in international espionage-related conflicts often need a diverse and intricate strategy. The involvement of international tribunals, sanctions, and coercive measures, as well as bilateral discussions, are crucial parts of this process (Setlur & Tory, 2022)

3.2.1. Bilateral Negotiations

Bilateral consultations between the relevant nations are a common first step in settling espionage cases. Direct negotiations between high-level officials might occur in the form of meetings or covert discussions. Prisoner exchanges or the return of espionage suspects are common components of the agreements achieved in these situations. By avoiding intermediaries and convoluted international legal procedures, this method facilitates a mutually agreeable conclusion between the disputing parties.

The first step often done by nations in such a circumstance is to resolve espionage charges via bilateral discussions. When dealing with delicate matters like espionage, this method provides the required flexibility and secrecy. To help find a solution, high-level officials from both sides may meet face-to-face to negotiate the matter, away from the scrutiny of the media and the public eye. A prisoner swap or the return of espionage suspects are typically reasonable options in such a situation. Not only does this put a stop to the immediate problem caused by the espionage, but it also often aids in reducing diplomatic tensions.

There are time and effort savings benefits to this bilateral method. Rapid and mutually beneficial agreements may be reached via bilateral discussions, as opposed to the more drawn-out and complicated international legal processes. But this method isn't without its flaws. Decisions may, for instance, be influenced less by impartial and objective standards of international law and more by political interests and negotiating power. Furthermore, when it comes to long-term international stability and order, solutions derived from bilateral discussions aren't always reflective of worldwide norms and standards.

3.2.2. The Role of the International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) may hear cases involving espionage issues when bilateral discussions fail to provide outcomes. As the primary court of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the authority to rule on the matter and make recommendations to the parties involved, subject to their agreement to the decision's terms. Additionally, if the espionage case involves delicate or complicated legal issues, specialised tribunals or arbitration courts may be established to deal with it.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and similar international tribunals are often summoned to hear espionage cases when bilateral talks break down. When it comes to matters involving member states, the ICJ plays a significant role as the primary UN judicial organisation (Chen et al., 2022). Legal judgements or recommendations on the case may be provided by the ICJ in the context of espionage, but this is contingent upon the parties' agreement to adhere to the court's ruling. With this step, the bilateral method is taking its place in the international legal arena, where a more structured and principle-based system for conflict resolution is available (Hildebrandt, 2018).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not have exclusive jurisdiction over cases of espionage involving sensitive or complex legal issues; instead, it may refer such cases to special tribunals or arbitration courts. It is possible to form such tribunals or panels to deal with the specific complexities of each espionage case in order to better address the multi-faceted legal issues involved. This approach could be useful for cases that don't fit neatly into any preexisting categories or where the ICJ's previous remedies have failed. Legal options that reject political and diplomatic resolutions in favour of decisions grounded on fair and objective principles of international law include submitting the matter to the ICJ or creating a special tribunal.

3.2.3. Sanctions and Coercive Measures

When dealing with espionage, political and economic penalties are useful instruments. Economic or political penalties, such as trade restrictions, asset freezes, or the severance of diplomatic relations, may be imposed by countries who believe they have been victimised by espionage. Affected nations may also go to the United Nations or another international body for help in taking action or applying pressure on espionage-accused nations.

Sanctions, both economic and political, are a common means of dealing with transnational espionage conflicts. Some nations may punish the state they believe is guilty of espionage by imposing penalties on its citizens and businesses. Severing diplomatic ties is a severe measure that reflects profound discontent and could have far-reaching effects on bilateral relations; asset freezes aim to stop financial flows and limit the accused state's capacity to operate in the international sphere; and trade restrictions limit access to markets and resources, which can affect the accused country's economy (Abdussamad et al., 2023).

Nations that are feeling the pinch may do more than just impose these penalties; they can also turn to global institutions like the UN for help. In international bodies like the United Nations, the country may state its stance, rally support, and call for collective action or pressure on other nations that are being held accountable for espionage. In addition to putting further pressure on the accused nation, this action helps keep international standards and the international legal system strong. By taking this tack, governments that feel wronged want to make sure that anti-espionage measures are based on global agreement and not simply on their own interests.

Reducing the likelihood of further conflict escalation, this strategy also makes it feasible to investigate less violent and more diplomatic resolutions.

3.2.4. Legal and Political Implications

The resolution of espionage conflicts sometimes has far-reaching consequences in political and judicial spheres. International collaboration in many domains may be impacted by espionage instances, which can exacerbate diplomatic tensions, harm bilateral ties, and more. The media and public sentiment often have a significant impact on how governments react to espionage incidents. The need of preserving stable diplomatic ties must be considered alongside the interests of the countries engaged in espionage cases, which must be balanced. The handling of espionage cases may also have an impact on the country's image and reputation abroad.

In addition to the legal ramifications, the political and diplomatic ramifications of settling espionage issues may be substantial. Cases of espionage often lead to heightened diplomatic tensions, which may wreak havoc on the carefully cultivated bilateral ties between the nations concerned. From commerce and finance to security and cultural interchange, this espionage case may have far-reaching consequences (Abdussamad dkk., 2023).

Public opinion and the media play a critical influence in this situation. The public's perceptions and opinions are influenced by the media's frequent attention to espionage cases. This could therefore have an impact on the decisions made by the government and how they tackle the issue. The concerned governments have to balance their national security goals and diplomatic tactics with navigating this public pressure.

Moreover, a nation's reputation and image abroad are frequently reflected in and influenced by how it handles espionage cases. While activities that are viewed as aggressive or out of proportion can harm a nation's reputation, a fair approach that complies with international legal standards can help the nation's image. As a result, the participating nations must carefully weigh their interests in maintaining stable and positive diplomatic relations against those of national security. The entirety of this procedure demonstrates the significance of diplomacy, international law, and strategic communication in the management and resolution of espionage cases in the contemporary global society.

4. Conclusion

Serious and diverse repercussions may be had by espionage incidents in the context of nations' diplomatic relations. The Vienna Convention of 1961 states that states that engage in espionage may have their diplomatic officials designated as "persona non grata" as a form of retribution. This is governed by Article 9 paragraph (1) of the Vienna agreement, which, as indicated in Article 43 of the same agreement, might lead to the termination of diplomatic ties between the two nations. Taking this drastic measure demonstrates the receiving country's unhappiness with the sending country's behaviour, which goes against diplomatic conventions and agreements. Countries that engage in espionage may face sanctions such as persona non grata status and the termination of diplomatic ties. In extreme cases, such as where the espionage was ordered or carried out by an agency of that country's government, they may even be taken before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Every branch of government is liable for its own activities if they violate international law, as stated in Article 4 of the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful activities Draught Articles. It encompasses the deeds done by persons or entities with official standing under the country's internal legislation.

By submitting a matter to the ICJ under Article 34 paragraph (1) of the ICJ Statute, the need of resolving conflicts via international legal processes is acknowledged. This action demonstrates a preference for peaceful, diplomatic, and legally-based dispute resolution over more confrontational methods, and it stresses the significance of adhering to international legal standards and preserving world order. The International Court of Justice, the revocation of diplomatic ties, or the imposition of persona non grata status are among the remedies available

to states in situations of diplomatic espionage. Keeping diplomatic ties steady, protecting national sovereignty, and adhering to international law are all factors that went into this decision. This method also demonstrates that the significance of international norms and processes for handling major breaches of international relations has been acknowledged.

Because espionage is such a delicate topic, researchers encounter several ethical and legal hurdles while conducting their studies. The thoroughness of the research might be hindered due to restrictions on accessing sensitive materials or conducting interviews with intelligence professionals. Patterns and differences may be seen by comparing espionage laws and practices across nations. This may be useful for figuring out where the field of international law can need some further work.

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